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	Just	over	30	years	ago,	the	only	successful	Revolution	to	have	taken	place	 in	 the	 Commonwealth	 Caribbean	 collapsed.	 Severe	 internal	divisions	 and	 United	 States	 (US)	 intervention	 ended	 the	 People’s	Revolutionary	Government’s	(PRG)	time	in	office.	Selwyn	Strachan	was	a	key	member	of	the	New	Jewel	Movement	(NJM)	and	Minister	of	National	Mobilisation	and	Labour.	After	the	US	invasion	Strachan	was	imprisoned	for	almost	26	years	for	his	alleged	role	in	the	death	of	Prime	Minister	and	leader	of	the	Revolution,	Maurice	Bishop.		
Why	did	you	become	so	actively	involved	in	Grenadian	politics	during	
the	 1970s?	 Describe	 the	 nature	 of	 Grenadian	 society	 in	 the	 1970s	
under	the	premiership	of	Eric	Gairy?		I	was	part	of	the	rise	of	Black	Power	politics	in	the	Caribbean	and	it	was	 an	 exciting	 period.	 Maurice	 Bishop	 returned	 to	 the	 country	after	studying	here	in	Britain;	and	he	was	also	involved	in	political	
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 movements	 in	Britain,	progressive	movements	and	so	as	he	 came	back	to	Grenada	with	a	 lot	of	 ideas	that	were	generated	 in	British	society	 and	 immediately	 embarked	 upon	 political	 organisations,	political	work	to	help	lift	the	consciousness	of	Black	people	in	our	country.	 So	 I	 was	 bitten	 by	 all	 of	 that	 and	 at	 the	 same	 time	 the	Government	 of	 the	 day,	 led	 by	 Sir	 Eric	 Gairy,	 was	 engaging	 in	 a	number	of	human	rights	violations	against	 the	ordinary	people	 in	society.	 He	was	 also	 not	 tackling	 the	 economic	 problems.	 In	 that	context	progressive	revolutionary	struggles	emerged	gradually.	So	we	 had	 a	 situation	 in	 1973,	 Gairy	 waged	 a	 struggle	 of	 violence	against	 the	 newly	 established	 NJM	 and	 its	 leading	 members,	including	myself.	 I,	 and	 some	of	my	 colleagues,	were	 thrown	 into	prison.	 This	 provoked	 mass	 democratic	 protests	 throughout	 the	country.	Further	on	in	the	middle	of	the	1970s	Gairy	passed	a	law	to	 stifle	 our	 newspaper	 which	 in	 fact	 was	 having	 great	 impact	among	the	people,	raising	their	consciousness.	There	 were	 a	 number	 of	 killings	 of	 people	 who	 were	 known	opponents	of	Gairy.	One	 guy	Harris	 Strawn	a	 cousin	of	mine	who	met	his	death	as	a	 result	of	 the	 ‘Mongoose	Gang’	which	Gairy	had	operate	on	his	behalf.	Another	 cousin	of	mine,	Alistair	 Strawn,	he	was	 also	 killed	 by	 the	 Gairy	 forces	 simply	 because	 he	 came	 to	attend	a	meeting	in	the	market	square.	So	all	these	different	things	really	galvanised	the	people	into	action	and	more	or	less	prepared	the	country	 for	what	eventually	 took	place	 in	1979,	which	 is	now	known	as	the	Grenadian	Revolution.		
Please	say	a	few	words	about	the	Revolution	itself	and	the	early	days	
and	 weeks	 of	 the	 PRG?	 What	 were	 the	 immediate	 priorities	 and	
challenges?		The	Revolution	 triumphed	 on	March	 13th	 1979.	 It	was	 not	 a	 case	where	 we	 got	 up	 one	 morning	 and	 decided	 in	 fact	 to	 launch	 an	assault	on	the	army	barracks	which	was	in	the	south	of	the	island	and	then	announce	that	we	were	in	power	now.	This	was	a	gradual	process	because	we	in	the	NJM	stated	clearly	in	our	manifesto	that	we	would	engage	in	all	forms	of	struggle	although	we	preferred	the	peaceful	approach	to	power.	But	it	had	reached	a	stage	where	Gairy	was	becoming	more	 and	more	 repressive	 and	 it	was	not	 possible	for	 the	 democratic	 process	 to	 be	 adhered	 to	 in	 all	 its	 facets	 and	dimensions.	 So	 after	 the	 bloody	 assault	 on	 the	NJM	 leadership	 in	1973	 it	 was	 felt	 by	 the	 leadership	 that	 while	 we	 continued	 to	engage	in	democratic	forms	of	struggle	we	had	to	be	prepared	for	
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 other	 forms	of	 struggle.	Therefore	we	 created	what	we	 called	 the	Military	 Wing	 of	 the	 NJM,	 similar	 to	 what	 was	 created	 by	 the	African	National	Congress	(ANC)	in	South	Africa.	We	had	to	do	that	because	 of	 the	 direction	 the	 country	was	moving	 in.	 Not	 that	we	wanted	to	do	that	but	we	were	forced	into	that	situation.	By	March	1979	the	military	wing	of	our	party	was	more	or	less	ready	 for	 the	 final	assault.	Gairy	 sensing	something	was	afoot	 left	Grenada	on	a	State	Visit	leaving	instructions	to	arrest	and	imprison	the	 leadership	 of	 the	 NJM.	 March	 13th	 was	 not	 set	 as	 a	 date	 for	revolution;	 no	 specific	 date	 was	 set	 down,	 but	 because	 the	 way	things	 were	 unfolding	 we	 had	 to	 bring	 the	 assault	 on	 the	 Gairy	leadership	earlier	than	anticipated.		Therefore	 early	 in	 the	morning	 of	March	 13th	 the	 forces	were	gathered	 in	 the	south	of	 the	 island	and	given	specific	 instructions	and	at	4.15	a.m.	 the	military	wing	of	 the	NJM	 launched	 its	assault	on	the	Gairy	dictatorship.	The	True	Blue	Barracks,	where	the	army	was	 located,	was	 attacked.	The	 element	of	 surprise	was	used	 and	within	 minutes	 the	 entire	 army	 was	 scattered	 and	 we	 had	 our	forces	 deployed	 throughout	 the	 country	 to	 seize	 the	 36	 police	stations.	At	 the	same	 time	 there	were	prepared	statements	which	called	upon	the	people	to	come	out	in	their	numbers	to	support	the	revolutionary	 forces.	The	people	were	waiting	 for	 that.	That’s	 the	important	point	about	the	Revolution.	Thousands	of	people	rallied	to	the	call	instantly	without	hesitation	as	though	they	were	waiting	for	the	call.	From	then	on	there	was	no	turning	back.		The	Revolution	 immediately	embarked	upon	a	 course	of	 social	reforms,	economic	reforms,	bringing	benefits	to	the	people	because	we	already	had	our	manifesto	and	our	programme	organised	and	we	were	explaining	to	the	people	throughout	the	years	before	what	we	were	going	 to	be	doing	once	 there	was	a	 transfer	of	power	 in	the	 country.	 So	 our	 priorities	 in	 the	 early	 days	 of	 the	 Revolution	were	 in	 fact	 to	 create	 a	 number	 of	 social	 programmes	 to	 bring	some	 immediate	 relief	 to	 the	 poor	 and	 working	 people	 of	 our	country.	 We	 had	 a	 feeding	 programme,	 which	 was	 so	 important	because	 poor	 people	 were	 suffering,	 we	 had	 a	 School	 Feeding	Programme,	we	 had	 free	 scholarships,	 including	 to	 study	 abroad,	free	 education,	 schoolbooks,	 and	 uniforms.	 All	 these	 were	 initial	social	 programmes	 we	 had	 to	 institute	 right	 away	 in	 order	 to	consolidate	 the	 process,	 while	 we	 thought	 about	 the	 bigger	economic	programmes,	as	they	required	more	planning.	Another	 important	 aspect	was	 protecting	 the	 Revolution	 from	external	aggression.	Within	months	of	 the	Revolution	taking	place	
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 we	in	fact	said	we	have	to	diversify	our	external	relations.	And	one	of	the	countries	we	said	we	had	to	try	to	get	closer	to	us	was	Cuba	because	 of	 what	 Cuba	 has	 been	 doing	 for	 Third	World	 countries	historically.	 This	 of	 course	 angered	 the	 US	 instantly,	 so	 that	 the	Ambassador	 to	 the	 region	who	was	 in	 the	 Caribbean	 at	 the	 time,	paid	us	 a	 visit	 in	Grenada	 and	held	discussions	with	Maurice	 and	essentially	 issued	 a	 threat	 to	 Grenada	 that	 the	 US	will	 view	with	displeasure	 any	 cosying	 up	 or	 close	 relations	 with	 Cuba,	 and	basically	our	tourist	industry	will	be	put	under	serious	threat	as	a	result.	 And	 that	 was	 the	 first	 serious	 threat	 coming	 from	 the	 US	against	the	Revolution	and	that	threat	continued	in	different	forms	right	 through	until	October	1983,	because	the	US	was	determined	the	closer	we	got	to	Cuba	the	more	determined	it	would	become	in	terms	 of	 overthrowing	 the	 Revolution.	 This	 was	 an	 important	aspect	of	 the	whole	process	 that	 took	place	 in	 the	 four	and	a	half	years	of	 the	Revolution,	because	 it	was	 felt	 that	 in	order	 for	us	 to	continue	to	bring	more	and	more	benefits	to	the	people	we	had	to	defend	 the	 Revolution	 and	 therefore	 had	 to	 deploy	 a	 lot	 of	resources	in	that	area,	small	as	we	were,	limited	in	resources	as	we	were,	 we	 had	 to	 be	 seen	 to	 be	 doing	 something	 to	 protect	 the	Revolution	 and	 protect	 the	 gains	 of	 the	 Revolution	 because	 the	people	were	 in	 fact	 enjoying	a	period	 in	 their	 life	 that	 they	never	enjoyed	before.		
The	 PRG	 wanted	 to	 fundamentally	 restructure	 the	 nature	 of	
Grenadian	 society,	 and	 make	 a	 cleaner	 break	 with	 the	 British	
colonial	 period.	 Could	 you	 talk	 about	 the	 key	 economic	 and	 social	
reforms	undertaken	by	the	government?		We	 inherited	 a	 backward	 economy.	 Our	 economy	 was	 basically	agricultural	 in	 nature	 and	 we	 were	 growing	 crops	 for	 export.	Further,	the	business	class	was	very	small	and	their	main	thrust	for	many	years	was	to	in	fact	import	wholesale	and	retail.	The	business	sector	never	engaged	in	productive	activity;	they	never	engaged	in	the	 productive	 sector	 of	 the	 economy—such	 as	 taking	 a	 strong	stake	in	agriculture.	So	we	inherited	that	kind	of	situation.	Our	goal	eventually	was	 to	build	Socialism,	but	we	knew	that	would	 take	a	very	long	time,	this	cannot	be	done	overnight,	but	the	basis	can	be	created	 for	 that	 to	 happen	10,	 15,	 20	 years	 down	 the	 line.	 But	 in	fact	 in	 order	 to	 do	 that	 we	 had	 to	 embark	 upon	 a	 non-capitalist	path	 of	 development	 or	 the	 path	 of	 Socialist	 orientation,	 and	 the	mixed	economy	model	was	the	best	option	to	do	that.	In	the	mixed	
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 economy	we	made	it	clear	the	State	would	play	the	dominant	role	in	economic	activity.	The	private	sector	would	play	its	role	and	the	co-operative	 sector	would	play	 its	 role.	 State-activism	was	crucial	because	 as	 I	 mentioned	 earlier	 the	 private	 sector	 was	 small	 and	afraid	to	get	into	the	productive	sector	and	take	risks.		So	we	got	engaged	in	agriculture.	We	established	what	we	called	the	 Grenada	 Farms	 Co-operative.	 Now	 understand	 in	 the	 Gairy	days,	 Gairy	 seized	 a	 number	 of	 agricultural	 estates	 for	 political	reasons	 and	 he	 started	 to	 cut	 up	 these	 estates	 to	 give	 to	 his	supporters.	 But	 then	 after	 a	 while	 he	 stopped	 and	 these	 estates	remained	idle,	nothing	was	happening.	They	were	taken	away	from	his	opponents	but	nothing	was	being	produced	on	 them,	 so	 there	was	a	basis	there	for	us	to	put	these	estates	under	State	control,	so	we	could	grow	more	 food.	At	 the	 same	 time	we	established	agro-industries	for	the	first	time	in	Grenada	to	utilise	the	crops	we	were	growing	on	the	State	farms	and	by	private	farmers.	So	very	quickly	during	 the	 Revolution	 we	 started	 to	 produce	 nectars,	 jams	 and	jellies	with	several	factories	and	we	began	to	export	some	of	these	things.	 These	 were	 State	 enterprises.	 Also	 we	 established	 a	presence	in	tourism.	A	number	of	Gairy-owned	hotels	were	seized	and	placed	under	State	control.	Further,	 the	State	was	 involved	 in	manufacturing	(e.g.	a	fish	processing	plant	to	produce	saltfish)	and	the	 extraction	 of	 gravel	 used	 for	 the	 construction	 industry.	 We	were	also	involved	in	the	financial	sector,	because	we	brought	two	or	three	banks	under	State	control.	Of	 course,	 the	 private	 sector	 still	 continued	 to	 operate	 in	 all	those	areas	I	am	talking	about,	but	we	were	in	fact	competing	with	the	private	sector	and	we	made	it	clear	that	the	State	sector	would	be	 dominant	 in	 the	 process.	We	 established	 other	 things	 like	 the	Marketing	 and	 National	 Importing	 Board	 to	 purchase	 the	agricultural	produce	from	the	farmers	for	resale	abroad	as	well	as	locally	and	at	the	same	time	this	agency	was	being	used	to	import	basic	 foodstuffs	 to	be	sold	 to	 the	population	at	a	 reasonable	price	and	 compete	with	 the	private	 sector	 in	 terms	of	 price.	 In	 a	 sense	this	helped	to	civilise	and	control	the	cost	of	living	overall,	because	if	 the	 State	was	 engaged	 in	 producing	 goods	 and	 services	 for	 the	society	at	a	reasonable	price	it	made	it	very	difficult	for	the	private	sector	to	increase	the	price	of	their	goods	at	an	astronomical	pace,	because	they	would	lose	more	and	more	business.	By	 1983	 we	 had	 44	 State	 enterprises	 operating	 in	 different	sectors	of	the	economy.	They	were	run	under	proper	management	structures—not	 by	 the	 central	 government—because	 we	
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 recognised	 that	 whenever	 central	 government	 was	 involved	 in	these	 kinds	 of	 activities	 these	 entities	 go	 bankrupt	 within	 a	relatively	short	space	of	time.	So	it	was	clear	to	us	if	these	were	to	produce	profits	for	the	country	they	had	to	be	run	properly.	But	the	companies	belonged	to	the	State,	they	belonged	to	the	people,	and	that	 was	 creating	 the	 basis	 eventually	 for	 the	 Socialist	transformation	 of	 society.	 We	 began	 to	 see	 results	 almost	instantaneously	 because	 it	 was	 very	 effective	 in	 the	 returns	 that	were	 going	 into	 the	 Treasury	 and	 in	 turn	we	were	 able	 to	 utilise	this	 to	 help	 build	 the	 country	 further,	 quite	 apart	 from	 the	assistance	we	were	getting	from	different	parts	of	the	world.		But	a	crucial	aspect	of	our	economic	policy,	key	to	many	of	the	other	things,	was	the	building	and	construction	of	the	international	airport,	which	was	 first	and	 foremost	 for	 the	 tourist	 industry,	but	also	for	all	other	areas	of	the	economy,	because	as	Maurice	pointed	out	many	times,	the	international	airport	was	the	gateway	for	our	economic	 transformation.	 And	 that	 is	 why	 the	 US	 brought	enormous	 pressure	 on	 the	Revolution	 to	 stop	 the	 construction	 of	that	 airport.	 The	 propaganda	 was	 massive.	 They	 engaged	 all	 the	international	 institutions	 to	 deny	 us	 from	 getting	 aid	 to	 assist	 us	with	the	project.	Cuba	was	of	course	the	main	contributor	not	only	in	 terms	 of	material	 but	manpower.	 Cuban	workers	were	 sent	 to	Grenada	 to	assist	us	 in	 the	building	of	 that	airport	and	Grenadian	workers	were	put	alongside	Cuban	workers	 to	acquire	 their	skills	that	 could	 be	 used	 in	 other	 arenas	 in	 building	 society	 when	 the	airport	 was	 completed.	 That	 was	 our	 plan	 and	 that	 airport	(completed	 after	 the	 US	 invasion)	 was	 critical	 for	 the	 tourist	industry	 and	 other	 sections	 of	 the	 economy,	 and	 it	 has	 been	 a	saviour	to	the	country	since	then.	For	the	first	time	in	our	country	we	were	seeing	a	real	National	pride	 coming	 out.	 Real	 patriotism	 of	 the	 people.	 People	 were	willing	 to	 come	 forward	 to	 participate	 in	 the	 building	 of	 their	country.	 People’s	 participation.	 People’s	 democracy.	 The	 level	 of	involvement	has	not	been	seen	before	or	since.	And	that	is	why	in	fact	today,	31	years	after	the	Revolution	imploded,	people	are	still	using	 what	 took	 place	 between	 ‘79	 and	 ‘83	 as	 a	 bench-mark	 for	further	economic	development.		
There	have	been	criticisms	of	the	authoritarian	tendencies	of	the	PRG	
(e.g.	 power	 and	 authority	 flowed	 clearly	 downwards	 from	 a	 very	
small	 group	 of	 officials	 within	 the	 NJM;	 ‘heavy	 manners’	 against	
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opponents;	 closure	 of	 Torchlight	 and	Grenadian	Voice).	How	would	
you	respond	to	such	criticisms?		Well	 I	 would	 say	 straight	 away	 these	 criticisms	 are	 very	 valid	because	we	in	fact	unfortunately	found	ourselves	doing	some	of	the	same	things	for	which	we	attacked	Gairy.	I	think	we	were	infected	in	the	same	way	by	the	influence	of	British	colonialism	in	terms	of	using	 violence	 to	deal	with	political	 opposition.	That	was	 the	 soft	under	belly,	the	Achilles	heel,	of	the	Revolution	in	spite	of	the	many	great	things	that	were	done.	Dissent	was	not	tolerated.	Those	who	had	genuine	views	of	a	different	kind	were	kept	out,	and	that	led	to	political	detainees,	arrests,	and	trials.	We	tried	to	explain	that	in	a	Revolutionary	 situation	 there	 will	 always	 be	 dislocation;	 that	 we	were	 finding	our	 feet	 in	power;	 and	we	knew	 that	 the	Americans	were	placing	enormous	pressure	on	us	and	were	trying	to	use	local	elements	 to	 create	 subversion.	 None	 the	 less	 in	 hindsight	 the	authoritarian	streak	was	a	mistake	as	it	was	not	necessary	and	the	criticism	 is	 valid	 to	 a	 great	 extent.	 We	 should	 have	 been	 more	tolerant,	 and	 we	 have	 apologised	 to	 the	 Grenadian	 people	 who	were	victims	of	that	kind	of	repression.		But	 let	 me	 point	 out	 that	 we	 were	 building	 Revolutionary	Democracy	 in	Grenada.	 In	other	words	democracy	not	built	 along	the	Westminster	model,	because	we	were	very	strong	on	this	thing,	that	the	people	should	be	involved	in	the	building	of	the	country	on	a	day-to-day	basis	and	we	had	bill	boards	throughout	 the	country	reflecting	 that.	 ‘Not	 a	 day	without	 a	 struggle.’	 ‘Grow	what	we	 eat	and	 eat	 what	 we	 grow.’	 That	 was	 part	 of	 the	 Revolution.	 There	were	 bill	 boards	 throughout	 the	 country	 with	 these	 very	 catchy	slogans,	 which	 the	 people	 were	 gravitating	 to	 and	 the	Revolutionary	 Democracy	 took	 the	 form	 of	 the	 establishment	 of	parish	 and	 zonal	 councils	 throughout	 the	 country	 where	 people	were	 able	 to	meet	 on	 a	 weekly,	 fortnightly	 and	monthly	 basis	 in	their	 different	 areas,	 whether	 it	 was	 in	 a	 school	 or	 a	 community	centre	to	discuss	what	was	happening	in	their	area,	as	well	as	what	was	 happening	 nationally	 and	 internationally,	 and	 able	 to	 make	suggestions	as	 to	what	 the	government	should	and	should	not	do,	including	in	relation	to	the	national	budget	(the	‘People’s	Budget’).		You	had	a	situation	where	technocrats	and	political	leaders	like	myself	would	have	to	go	before	the	people:	full	house,	packed	with	people	 from	 a	 particular	 area	 who	 were	 able	 to	 raise	 issues,	criticise	certain	programmes,	ask	questions	of	the	technocrats	and	
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 so	forth	and	get	answers	and	get	a	report	to	them	down	the	line	as	to	what	was	happening.	So	this	was	real	democracy.	We	 also	 had	 mass	 organisations,	 such	 as	 the	 National	 Youth	Organisation,	 the	 National	 Women’s	 Organisation,	 the	 Farmers	Organisation,	the	Pioneers,	the	Militia,	and	so	forth.	People	in	these	groups	were	looking	at	the	problems	of	women	on	a	sectorial	basis,	looking	at	the	problems	of	youth	on	a	sectorial	basis,	farmers	on	a	sectorial	 basis,	 and	 there	 could	 be	 some	 overlap	 with	 the	 zonal	councils.	With	input	from	these	groups	we	passed	important	social	legislation,	including	in	relation	to	women	and	labour.		It	was	 a	 different	 thing	we	were	 building	 in	 Grenada	 and	 this	eventually	would	have	 led	 to	elections	of	a	different	kind	because	we	had	taken	a	decision,	rightly	or	wrongly,	in	the	very	early	days	of	the	Revolution	to	have	proper	and	real	democratic	elections	five	years	 after	 the	Revolution	 triumphed,	 but	we	needed	 to	 establish	these	national	democratic	structures	across	the	country	in	order	to	achieve	that.		
What	were	 the	main	 reasons	 for	 the	 serious	 internal	 dispute	 inside	
the	 leadership	 of	 the	 PRG/NJM	 during	 the	 summer	 and	 autumn	 of	
1983?		Things	were	 happening	 in	 the	 Revolution	 at	 a	 rapid	 pace,	 people	were	 getting	 enormous	 benefits	 but	 by	 1983	 we	 had	 reached	 a	stage	where	it	can	be	said	that	the	system	was	overloaded	and	this	led	to	system	breakdown.	Because	of	the	number	of	things	we	were	doing	party	members	were	having	so	many	 things	 to	do	and	very	little	 time	 to	 recharge	 the	batteries	 a	 lot	 of	people	were	breaking	down.	Throughout	 the	country	 it	was	happening	–	 leaders	as	well	as	rank	and	file	party	members.	The	thing	was	getting	so	bad	that	a	rebellion	was	kind	of	brewing,	because	the	Revolution	was	clearly	at	risk.	I	don’t	think	it	was	losing	support,	but	there	was	certainly	a	falloff	in	activities	precisely	because	of	system	overload	and	system	breakdown.		Fundamentally	the	people	remained	with	the	Revolution.	It	was	just	that	by	1982	the	activities	were	not	as	vibrant	as	they	were	in	the	first	three	years.	Even	the	masses,	even	the	people	themselves	were	having	more	and	more	 to	do.	 Imagine	 that.	 It	was	one	 thing	for	 the	 vanguard	 party	 to	 be	 overworked	 and	 overloaded	 and	breaking	down,	but	the	people	that	you	were	leading,	lots	of	them	were	also	getting	tired	because	the	Revolution	was	doing	so	many	things.	As	well	 as	 this	we	continued	 to	be	 faced	with	 the	external	
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 pressures,	and	this	added	to	the	stresses	and	strains.	However,	it	is	important	 to	 mention	 here	 that	 there	 was	 no	 real	 ideological	disunity	 within	 the	 party,	 including	 between	 Maurice	 and	 other	members	of	 the	central	committee	such	as	myself.	 In	my	view	the	problems	into	1983	were	down	primarily	to	system	overload.	Recognising	 the	 gravity	 of	 the	 situation	 the	 party	 met	 in	September/October	 1983	 in	 an	 attempt	 to	 correct	 the	 problems.	First,	 the	 Central	 Committee	 met	 and	 it	 was	 here	 that	 a	 formal	proposal	 for	 joint	 leadership	of	 the	party	was	put	 forward.	 It	was	felt	 by	 many	 that	 combining	 Maurice’s	 strength	 with	 the	 masses	and	 Bernard	 Coard’s	 organisational	 skills	 would	 better	 help	 to	address	 the	 problems	 facing	 the	 Revolution.	 But	 I	 want	 to	 stress	the	 proposal	 was	 for	 joint	 leadership	 of	 the	 party,	 not	 the	 State,	because	 the	propagandists	 and	 those	mischief	makers	around	 the	world	 totally	 and	 deliberately	 distorted	 that	 entire	 position	 for	years	 and	 tried	 to	 give	 the	 impression	 that	 it	 was	 something	 to	share	power	at	the	level	of	the	State,	 joint	Prime	Minister	etc.	The	way	we	saw	 it	was	 that	we	needed	 to	share	responsibility	 for	 the	party	work,	to	redevelop	the	party,	and	make	it	what	it	was	for	the	previous	three	years	and	consolidate	the	gains	that	we	had	already	achieved	in	the	Revolution	and	to	build	on	that.	After	we	analysed	the	situation,	everybody	including	Maurice,	came	to	the	conclusion	that	 if	 we	 do	 not	 take	 the	 necessary	 steps	 now	 the	 Revolution	would	collapse	in	the	near	future.	We	also	discussed	increasing	the	membership	 of	 the	 party	 and	 rationalising	 and	 prioritising	 the	work	of	every	single	existing	member.	But	 everything	was	pushed	 aside	 and	 all	 the	 focus	was	 on	 the	joint	leadership	question.	Initially,	Maurice	was	not	happy	with	the	proposal,	 as	 was	 his	 right,	 and	 he	 expressed	 the	 view	 that	 this	would	 be	 a	 vote	 of	 no	 confidence	 in	 his	 leadership.	 The	 Central	Committee	spent	three	days	discussing	and	reassuring	this	was	not	the	 case.	 The	 leader	 of	 the	 Revolution	 was	 Maurice;	 the	 prime	ministership	was	 unquestionably	 his;	 the	 Commander	 in	 Chief	 of	the	Armed	Forces	was	his.	 It	was	 just	an	 internal	party	reform,	 to	try	 and	 get	 the	party	work	back	on	 stream	and	 to	bring	back	 the	vibrancy	of	 the	past.	Then	a	vote	was	 taken.	Nine	supported	 joint	leadership	 and	 three	 abstained	 including	 Maurice,	 because	 he	wanted	 to	 hear	 what	 Coard’s	 position	 was,	 because	 the	 joint	leadership	was	between	Coard	and	himself.	At	the	time	Coard	was	not	 a	 member	 of	 the	 Central	 Committee	 as	 he	 had	 resigned	 one	year	 before,	 simply	 because	 his	 view	 was	 that	 Maurice	 was	 not	taking	steps	to	deal	with	certain	people	(e.g.	Vincent	Noel,	Unison	
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 Whiteman	and	Kenneth	Radix)	who	were	not	carrying	their	weight	at	the	level	of	the	leadership	and	they	were	not	coming	prepared	to	meetings	 and	 they	 were	 not	 contributing	 and	 were	 basically	becoming	dead	wood	and	the	work	was	being	left	to	just	a	few	of	us	and	 that	 was	 contributing	 to	 the	 system	 breakdown.	 Coard	 did	however	remain	Deputy	Prime	Minister.	Because	Maurice	 expressed	 concern	 about	 the	 proposal	 it	was	decided	the	decision	should	be	postponed	until	it	was	taken	to	the	membership	 of	 the	 party.	 At	 that	meeting	member	 after	member	set	out	their	position	in	support	of	the	Central	Committee	proposal	for	 joint	 leadership.	 At	 the	 same	 time	 they	 kept	 saying	 to	 the	Comrade	Leader	‘we	love	you’,	this	had	nothing	to	do	with	you;	this	was	for	the	Revolution	and	so	on.	And	Maurice	was	visibly	moved	by	that.	You	could	have	seen	it,	that	every	Party	member	expressed	confidence	 in	 him.	 And	 at	 the	 end	 of	 the	 day	 another	 vote	 was	taken	 by	 the	 entire	 membership.	 Every	 single	 member	 bar	 one,	including	 critically	 on	 that	 occasion	 Maurice	 voted	 for	 joint	leadership.	The	tension	in	the	party	evaporated	at	that	time.	And	in	fact	 there	 was	 great	 joy.	 The	 issue	 was	 settled.	 We	 can	 move	forward.	The	 next	 day	 Maurice	 left	 on	 a	 long-planned	 visit	 to	 Eastern	Europe.	The	feeling	was	the	battle	was	settled	and	party	members	felt	 great,	 that	 is	 it.	We	 are	 going	 forward.	 However,	 a	 big	 shock	was	 coming.	 A	 number	 of	 people	Maurice	 spent	 time	with	 on	 his	trip	 had	 been	 absent	 at	 the	 meetings	 and	 some	 were	 known	mischief-makers.	 They	 got	 to	 work	 on	 Maurice	 and	 pushed	 all	kinds	of	sinister	thoughts	in	his	head	about	the	joint	leadership	and	eventually	succeeded	in	getting	him	to	renege	on	the	decision	that	was	settled	before	he	left.	On	October	8th	Maurice	returned.	Obviously	you	could	see,	once	he	arrived,	there	was	that	re-emergence	of	tension.	I	sensed	it	right	away.	 I	 also	 learned	 subsequently	 that	 Maurice’s	 security	 were	issuing	 threats	 to	 certain	 people,	 including	 Coard.	 We	 sat	 in	 the	back	 of	 the	 car,	 his	 Prime	 Ministerial	 car	 and	 we	 were	 chatting	basically	 about	 the	 trip.	 Then	 we	 introduced	 the	 topic	 of	 joint	leadership,	and	basically	he	had	given	the	issue	some	more	thought	and	he	said	he	wanted	the	issue	brought	back	to	the	party	because	he	 was	 not	 prepared	 to	 go	 forward	 with	 it.	 I	 listened	 to	 him	carefully	 and	 I	 said,	 yes	 I	 hear	 what	 you	 say,	 and	 if	 that	 is	 your	position	I	think	you	should	be	given	a	further	chance.	Maurice	had	to	be	comfortable	with	what	was	being	planned.	
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 A	meeting	of	the	Central	Committee	was	organised	for	October	12th,	 and	 the	 first	 session	 was	 held	 without	 incident.	 But	 that	 is	when	the	turning	point	in	the	whole	process	began.	All	of	a	sudden	information	reached	us	that	there	was	a	rumour	flying	all	over	the	country	 that	 Phyllis	 and	 Bernard	 Coard	 were	 planning	 to	 kill	Maurice.	Everybody	knows	that	Maurice	was	well	loved	and	deeply	respected	by	the	people	in	our	country	and	afar.	So	the	moment	a	rumour	of	this	sort	hits	the	country	the	people	will	be	immediately	incensed	 and	 that	 is	what	 happened.	 Everybody	wanted	 to	 know	what	 was	 going	 on.	 In	 other	 words,	 the	 party	 crisis	 which	 was	going	 on	 for	 the	 past	 few	weeks	 now	 became	 a	 national	 political	crisis	 because	 it	 was	 taken	 outside	 in	 the	 form	 of	 a	 rumour,	 and	then	 of	 course	 later	 on	 it	was	 discovered	 the	 rumour	 had	 in	 fact	been	engineered	by	Maurice	himself.	Unfortunately,	 I	 have	 to	 make	 that	 point,	 the	 evidence	 was	unmistakeable	 and	 everybody	 was	 dejected.	 Maurice	 denied	anything	about	 the	 rumour,	but	when	 the	 rumour	hit	 the	 country	the	security	 forces	were	put	 in	a	quandary	as	to	how	to	deal	with	the	 situation	 and	 they	 in	 fact	 decided,	 rightly	 or	 wrongly	 (in	 the	end	 it	 turned	 out	 to	 be	 catastrophic),	 they	 suggested	 Maurice	should	 stay	 at	 home	–	which	meant	 house	 arrest.	 Coard	was	 also	advised	to	stay	at	home.	The	reasons	for	suggesting	they	both	stay	at	 home	 were	 different:	 for	 Maurice	 so	 not	 inflame	 the	 situation	and	for	Coard	to	protect	his	life	from	angry	supporters	of	Maurice.	But	 in	 effect	 the	 person	 who	 was	 confined	 to	 his	 house	 was	Maurice,	no	matter	how	it	was	worded;	it	was	indeed	house	arrest.	So	that	was	the	reaction	to	the	rumour.	The	 rumour	was	 the	 turning	point	 in	 the	 entire	 crisis,	 and	 the	house	 arrest	 was	 the	 point	 of	 no	 return.	 Nobody	 was	 thinking	properly	because	there	was	action	on	reaction.	And	this	thing	went	on	 for	 days,	 and	 demonstrations	 erupted	 spontaneously	throughout	 the	 country	 when	 it	 was	 heard	 Maurice	 was	 under	house	 arrest.	 People	were	 being	mobilised	 by	 the	 same	mischief-makers	 who	 caused	 Maurice	 to	 change	 his	 mind	 –	 cashing	 in	opportunistically	 on	 his	 popularity.	 On	 October	 13th	 when	Maurice’s	 house	 arrest	 took	 effect,	 an	 emergency	 meeting	 of	 the	general	membership	was	called	because	party	members	across	the	country	 were	 wondering	 how	 we	 were	 going	 to	 handle	 the	situation.	Even	though	Maurice	was	under	house	arrest	he	was	still	asked	to	come	to	the	emergency	meeting.	He	came	and	spoke	and	we	 all	 were	 there,	 the	 place	 was	 filled	 with	 Party	 members.	Maurice	 accepted	 responsibility	 for	 the	 state	 of	 things	 in	 the	
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 country,	 but	 at	 the	 same	 time	denied	 involvement	 in	 the	 rumour.	But	 then	 his	 deputy	 security	 official	 was	 called	 to	 talk	 about	 his	involvement	in	the	rumour	and	in	the	presence	of	Maurice	he	gave	a	blow-by-blow	account	as	 to	how	the	rumour	was	organised	and	what	 he	 was	 asked	 to	 do.	 The	 place	 was	 silent;	 everybody	 was	stunned.	 After	 he	 finished	 Maurice	 was	 asked	 if	 he	 wanted	 to	respond	 to	what	 the	 security	 person	had	 said,	 and	he	 said	no,	 he	wouldn’t	 respond,	and	you	could	see	 it	 in	 the	party	members,	 the	tears	were	coming	in	the	eyes.	However,	these	were	not	the	masses	where	 Maurice	 had	 very	 strong	 support.	 So	 demonstrations	 just	kept	spontaneously	coming	up	and	we	were	trying	to	hold	different	meetings	to	see	how	we	could	resolve	the	crisis.	I	held	several	meetings.	I	took	risks	to	go	and	talk	to	the	people	in	the	heart	of	the	capital,	in	St	George’s,	standing	in	the	middle	of	the	crowd.	I	could	have	been	lynched,	because	here	I	was	trying	to	explain	 to	people,	hostile	 to	what	 is	happening	and	wanted	 to	get	Coard.	But	after	a	while	people	got	hostile	and	wanted	to	hear	what	Maurice	had	to	say.	 I	said	yes	that	will	happen	but	I	must	tell	you	what	the	reasons	are	for	Maurice’s	house	arrest.	By	the	way	Coard	had	to	resign	his	position	of	Deputy	Prime	Minister	after	one	of	the	meetings	 when	 one	 of	 the	 persons	 who	 was	 fanning	 the	 flames	announced	 that	 I	 at	 a	meeting	 said	 that	he	had	been	made	Prime	Minister,	a	total	fabrication	to	fan	the	flames	and	this	was	sent	out	in	the	regions	and	so	on,	but	it	was	all	part	of	the	whole	thing.		But	by	 the	 time	October	18th	came,	seven	Ministers	of	 the	PRG	had	 resigned.	 In	 other	words	 the	 government	 collapsed	 basically,	seven	out	of	11	Cabinet	Ministers	 resigned,	 the	only	persons	 that	did	 not	 resign	 was	myself,	 Maurice	 of	 course	 the	 Prime	Minister	who	was	still	under	house	arrest,	plus	Hudson	Austin	and	Chris	De	Riggs.	Then	we	had	 to	 take	a	decision,	difficult	as	 it	was	 for	party	members,	because	another	emergency	meeting	had	to	be	called	on	the	18th	to	say	to	the	party	members,	now	look,	in	order	to	save	this	Revolution	we	have	to	back	down	on	this	joint	leadership	thing	and	a	 delegation	 has	 been	 put	 together	 to	 go	 and	 see	Maurice	 to	 put	before	him	a	compromise	proposal.	Saving	the	Revolution	was	a	key	factor	and	I	want	to	stress	that	point.	And	while	of	course	party	members	expressed	the	view	that,	look	Party	principles	 should	not	be	 compromised	and	 so	on,	 they	realised	 that	 a	 new	 course	 had	 to	 be	 taken.	 On	 the	 evening	 of	October	18th	a	four	man	delegation	–	I	wasn’t	in	it	–	visited	Maurice.	He	 agreed	 that	 in	 return	 for	 the	 joint	 leadership	 proposal	 being	withdrawn,	he	would	make	a	statement	that	he	had	to	take	a	lot	of	
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 responsibility	 for	 the	 state	 of	 things	 in	 the	 country.	We	were	 not	even	asking	him	to	say	that	he	spread	the	rumour.	No.	That	would	have	 been	 a	waste	 of	 time.	 But	 at	 least	 this	 thing	would	 save	 the	Revolution.	 But	 Maurice	 asked	 if	 could	 speak	 with	 a	 few	 close	confidents,	people	 like	George	Louison	–	one	of	 the	chief	mischief	makers.	 This	was	 agreed	 to.	 So	 the	 next	morning	 Louison	 visited	Maurice.	 He	 spent	 two	 hours	 there	 and	 by	 the	 time	 the	 meeting	finished,	 a	 large	 crowd	 had	 gathered	 outside	 Mount	 Wheldale	 –	Maurice’s	 official	 residence.	 They	were	 shouting	 and	 chanting	 for	Maurice.	The	army	unit	that	was	there	guarding	the	Prime	Minister	fired	some	shots	in	the	air	and	the	crowd	backed	off	and	when	they	realised	all	they	were	doing	was	firing	shots	in	the	air	to	keep	them	away,	 they	decided	 to	 surge	 forwards	and	 they	burst	 through	 the	gate,	went	into	the	yard,	got	Maurice	and	went	with	him.		
On	19	October	1983	Maurice	Bishop	and	seven	others	were	killed	by	
an	 army	 firing	 squad.	 Was	 there	 a	 direct	 order	 from	 the	 Central	
Committee	to	do	this?		Well	 first	 of	 all,	 there	was	 no	 order	 from	 the	 Central	 Committee,	even	though	those	who	put	us	on	trial	put	those	words	in	one	of	the	soldier’s	 mouths.	 The	 soldier	 who	 led	 the	 firing	 squad	 at	 Fort	Rupert	 said	 that	 there	was	 an	 order	 from	 the	Central	 Committee.	The	 fact	 that	 this	 question	 is	 still	 being	 asked	 today	 shows	 that	maybe	that	piece	of	evidence	has	not	been	accepted,	and	therefore	the	 search	 for	 who	 actually	 gave	 the	 order	 is	 still	 on.	 But	 the	Central	Committee	did	not	even	meet	on	October	19th	 contrary	 to	popular	opinion.	There	were	members	of	the	Central	Committee	all	over	 the	 place,	 including	 at	 Fort	 Frederick,	 not	 the	 place	 where	Maurice	was	killed.	Because	after	Maurice	was	released	from	house	arrest,	it	was	generally	accepted	and	believed	that	he	was	heading	back	 to	 the	market	 square	 to	 address	 the	people	who	were	 there	waiting	for	him.	When	they	reached	a	certain	point	just	to	go	down	the	hill	to	go	into	the	market	square,	a	small	section	of	that	crowd	decided	in	fact	to	guide	him	to	the	Army	HQ.	In	other	words	I	don’t	know	whether	that	was	pre-planned	or	not.	They	entered	the	fort,	they	 disarmed	 the	 soldiers	 who	 were	 on	 guard,	 they	 took	 their	weapons	 away	 from	 them,	 stripped	 them	 of	 their	 clothes,	 in	 fact	one	 of	 the	 females	were	 stripped	 down	 to	 her	 underwear	 by	 the	angry	crowd	that	went	with	Maurice.	Maurice	was	not	participating	in	that	of	course,	and	some	actually	 left	because	they	realised	this	
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 was	 a	 different	 situation	 altogether.	 So	 the	 entire	 thing	 changed	from	a	political	situation	to	a	military	one.		Some	 of	 the	 people	 armed	 themselves	 after	 accessing	 the	armoury.	 Some	 were	 militia	 trained	 over	 the	 years	 of	 the	Revolution.	 Two	 of	 the	 soldiers	 who	 had	 been	 detained	 escaped	and	went	up	to	Fort	Frederick	and	reported	to	a	Lieutenant	Colonel	who	 was	 there,	 because	 after	 Maurice	 was	 released,	 some	 of	 us	amongst	 the	 leadership	 were	 advised	 to	 go	 to	 Frederick	 for	 our	own	 safety.	 So	 some	 of	 us	 were	 at	 the	 fort;	 incidentally	 the	 fort	from	which	 the	 army	unit	was	 sent	 to	 restore	 order.	 Later	 in	 the	day,	 sometime	 after	 1	 p.m.,	 three	 armoured	 personnel	 carriers	were	ordered	 to	go	 to	 the	Fort	Rupert	 to	restore	order	and	chase	the	 people	 off	 the	 fort	 because	 there	 was	 chaos	 there	 and	 there	were	plans	afoot	to	arm	people	and	move	to	other	strategic	points	in	 the	 country.	 In	 other	 words	 it	 was	 clear	 that	 the	 country	 was	heading	for	civil	war	based	on	reports	of	what	was	coming	out.	So	that	had	to	be	nipped	in	the	bud.	On	arrival	 the	 first	armoured	car	was	ambushed,	because	 they	had	weapons	in	them,	AK47s	and	so	on,	and	Maurice’s	supporters	fired	upon	them.	That	of	course	was	a	surprise	because	the	soldiers	who	went	down	to	retake	the	fort	never	thought	the	people	would	respond	 in	 that	 way.	 They	 thought	 once	 they	 got	 there	 and	Maurice’s	 supporters	 saw	 the	 armoured	 cars	 they	 would	 be	subjugated,	 they	 would	 surrender.	 But	 the	 opposite	 happened.	Because	 based	 on	 what	 the	 Military	 Commanders	 told	 us	subsequently,	 the	 soldiers	 were	 instructed	 that	 when	 they	 get	there,	if	fired	upon,	because	it	was	still	a	military	situation,	if	fired	upon	 you	 have	 a	 right	 to	 return	 fire.	 And	 that	 is	what	 led	 to	 the	shoot	 out.	 When	 the	 first	 armoured	 car	 was	 attacked,	 a	 warrant	officer	 died	 instantly.	 The	 person	 who	 was	 leading	 the	 unit	 was	shot	and	died	at	the	hospital	a	few	minutes	later.	All	but	one	soldier	on	 the	 first	 armoured	 car	 was	 shot.	 Two	 died	 and	 the	 rest	 were	injured.	 The	 only	 person	 on	 the	 first	 armoured	 car	 who	 did	 not	receive	a	bullet	was	the	one	who	was	buried	inside	the	car	because	he	was	driving.	It	then	meant	that	the	other	two	armoured	cars	had	to	 take	over	 the	situation.	So	people	were	picked	up,	 in	 the	shoot	out	of	course,	as	we	subsequently	 learned	Maurice	was	not	killed,	neither	were	some	of	the	Ministers	and	they	in	fact	were	arrested,	they	were	 picked	 up	 and	 brought	 onto	 another	 level	 of	 the	 Fort,	and	there	was	a	lull	in	the	whole	process.	By	this	time	now	soldiers	were	 enraged	 because	 they	 had	 all	 watched	 and	 observed	 their	fellow	soldiers	being	killed	before	their	eyes	and	they	were	making	
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 sacrifices	 throughout	 the	 crisis,	 so	 that	 enraged	 them	 and	something	happened,	something	happened	in	that	lull,	and	it	was	in	that	 period	 of	 that	 enraged	 situation	 that	 those	who	were	 on	 the	fort	were	executed	as	 the	 term	was	being	used,	 shot	 and	killed,	 a	disaster,	a	tragedy	that	took	place.		We	should	have	been	able	to	resolve	our	problems	in	a	different	manner.	 The	 fact	 of	 the	matter	 is	 the	 people	who	 died	were	 fine	people,	 I	mean	we	 struggled	 together;	we	 faced	 the	 repression	of	Gairy	together.	I	mean	Maurice	Bishop	and	myself	and	his	wife	and	so	 on	 bled	 together	 in	 a	 cell	 in	 1973	 before	 the	 Revolution,	although	 all	 part	 of	 the	 build	 up,	 because	 of	 police	 brutality,	violence	inflicted	on	us,	we	were	engaging	in	activities	to	bring	the	masses	together.	After	we	were	beaten	and	so	on	we	were	thrown	into	a	cell	with	other	people	packed	up	like	sardines,	spending	the	entire	night	bleeding	to	death	and	so	on.	When	I	think	of	all	these	things	 and	 know	what	 happened	 subsequently	 it	 weighs	 a	 lot	 on	my	mind	 because	 I	 know	what	we	went	 through.	 People	 are	 still	surprised.	They	wonder	what	happened.	How	could	this	implosion	have	taken	place?	Just	out	of	the	blue.	Ultimately	 I	 believe	 some	 of	Maurice’s	 confidents	who	wanted	to	 further	 their	 own	 place	 in	 the	 Revolution	 and	 knowing	 that	Maurice	 had	 the	 support	 of	 the	 masses,	 encouraged	 and	 pushed	him	down	the	path	that	he	followed	–	not	thinking	where	this	thing	could	lead.	They	are	going	to	turn	around	and	say	that	we	are	the	ones	 who	 sacrificed	 the	 Revolution	 –	 those	 who	 supported	 joint	leadership.	 But	 the	 fact	 of	 the	 matter	 is	 here	 is	 somebody	(Strachan)	 who	 was	 extremely	 close	 to	 Maurice	 supporting	 a	position	 that	 I	 felt	 would	 help	 him	 and	 the	 Revolution.	 I	 had	 no	doubt	in	my	mind	at	the	time.	But	of	course	in	hindsight	we	have	to	think	differently	because	of	 the	human	reaction,	 the	human	factor	and	how	people	reacted	to	that	decision.	But	I	had	no	doubt	in	my	mind	at	the	time.		
What	 are	 your	 concluding	 thoughts	 about	 the	 rise	 and	 fall	 of	 the	
revolution?		We	should	have	cut	down	the	pace	by	half	and	prevented	October	19th	1983	than	having	this	situation	we	have	now.	That	is	the	stark	truth.	 And	 that	 is	 why	 I	 mean	 I	 could	 easily	 say	 look	 I	 spent	 26	years	in	prison.	Forget	me.	I	just	try	and	keep	myself	quiet	and	try	to	 live	 a	 nice	 life	 because	 I	 am	 old	 now	 and	 I	 struggled	 for	 my	freedom	 in	spite	of	 the	kangaroo	 trial	 that	was	given	 to	us	by	 the	
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 invaders.	 But	 I	 owe	 it	 to	 my	 country	 to	 at	 least	 try	 to	 give	 a	different	 perspective	 as	 to	 what	 happened.	 Difficult	 as	 it	 is,	 as	 it	may	 be,	 for	 people	 to	 absorb	 it	 because	 it	 is	 not	 easy	 to	 hear	 a	different	angle	of	things	based	on	what	you	have	been	hearing	for	the	past	 20	 something	 years	 by	 the	propaganda.	 It	 is	 not	 an	 easy	thing	but	I	still	decide	to	go	forward	and	engage	people	in	dialogue	and	 try	 and	 discuss	 the	 thing	 and	 see	 if	 we	 can	 get	 a	 better	appreciation	as	to	what	really	went	on.	As	I	said,	the	events	which	led	 to	 the	execution	of	Prime	Minister	Maurice	Bishop	and	others	cannot	 be	 condoned.	 They	 cannot	 be	 justified.	 It	 should	 not	 have	happened.	That	should	not	have	happened,	but	for	these	nefarious	activities	 of	 certain	 elements	 after	 Prime	 Minister	 Bishop	 in	 fact	fully	and	completely	supported	the	matter	that	was	brought	to	the	party.	Should	not	have	happened.		
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